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Introduction
With increasing concerns about global warming, a variety of policies are under consideration to reduce CO 2 emissions from road transport. The main measures are fuel taxes, emission standards, feebates, and innovation subsidies. In theory, fuel taxes present the advantage that they aect both the present and future of road transport emissions: car owners are immediately incited to drive less with their current car when fuel prices rise, while at the same time purchasing fuel-ecient cars becomes more attractive (see Austin & Dinan (2005) for a more extensive comparison). The composition of the vehicle eet could be durably changed, so that lock-in eects would guarantee future fuel savings. In France, road transport produces more than a third of total CO 2 emissions and much higher shares of other greenhouse gases.
1 However, previous results, based on the US market, emphasize an energy paradox, namely the fact that consumers systematically undervalue future economies of energy-eciency (e.g. Allcott & Wozny, 2014) . This paper analyzes the impact of fuel price variations, and more specically those due to changes in fuel taxes, on the structure of demand for new vehicles in France. We use our estimates to examine two policy alternatives: a carbon tax and the equalization of diesel and gasoline taxes.
In 2013, France passed a carbon tax that levies a tax based upon the CO 2 content of the fuel. This tax explicitly aims at reecting the externality cost to society, i.e. it is proportional to the amount of carbon emitted. However, the actual eectiveness of this new tax depends upon car purchasers' sensitivity to fuel eciency and fuel prices. As a rst result, we provide an ex ante estimation of the French carbon tax impact on the structure of car purchases, especially with regard to fuel eciency and emission intensities.
Especially in Europe, fuel is one of the most heavily taxed goods; with selling prices comprising up to 75% of taxes, as in France in 2003. Moreover, diesel and gasoline are taxed at dierent rates: after the 1970s era oil crisis, the French government decided to support fuel-ecient diesel cars by reducing taxes on diesel fuels relative to gasoline taxes. In 2011 the consumption tax on energy products reached e0.61 per liter of gasoline, while it amounted to e0.44 per liter of diesel. As shown by Hivert (2013) , the advantage given to diesel cars in France is particularly salient in an international comparison.
This tax advantage for diesel is subject to ongoing debate. Like many others, Cames & Helmers (2013) argue that environmental benets of diesel cars are overestimated: new technology decreases the spread between CO 2 -emission-eciency of diesel and gasoline cars, but diesel cars continue to produce other greenhouse gases (NOx, ozone, black carbon) and medically hazardous particulate matter.
2 In this context, Miravete et al. (2014) 1 http://www.citepa.org/en/air-and-climate/analysis-by-sector/transports 2 Since 2011, diesel particulate lters are mandatory for new vehicles in France (see Massé (2005) for a 2 go as far as to argue that diesel-friendly policy in Europe is essentially a non-tari trade barrier against American manufacturers. The production of diesel-models is also more CO 2 intensive because they are heavier. Against this background, the French government is considering the abolition of the relative advantages for diesel fuel; the (hypothetical) second policy under investigation in this study.
We use French car registration data from 2003 to 2007, which includes exhaustive information about both households' and rms' automobile purchases. Our main focus lies on the aggregate impact of fuel taxes on fuel eciency, emission levels and the share of diesel purchases. However, in order to correctly account for the heterogeneity of purchasers, we dierentiate between purchaser types. Our dataset allows for such a precise distinction, as it links technical car characteristics to information on the car holder, including age, activity status, and residential area for private consumers, and business sector and location for rms. This is a decisive advantage that enables us to dene types of purchasers to account for observed heterogeneity in preferences across purchasers. In particular, we can separate between private consumers and rms. While the latter represent a large share of purchases of new cars (more than one-third over the period) in France, limited evidence exists so far on their responsiveness to changes in fuel prices.
As it is common in this literature, we rely on a static discrete choice model assuming that the decision to buy a specic car is related to a valuation of several car characteristics, including the cost per kilometer. More specically, we rely on a nested logit that enables us to account for taste correlation within car market segments and between fuel-type versions of the same model. Over the studied period, fuel prices vary considerably. We identify the impact of fuel cost in car choice using time variation in fuel prices and cross-sectional differences in cars' fuel eciency. We estimate the elasticity of demand for cars with respect to an increase of oil prices (i.e. prices of all fuel-types exclusive of tax) and with respect to fuel taxes.
Our results suggest that short-term sensitivity of demand with respect to fuel prices is generally low, but presents signicant heterogeneity across purchasers. The dierence between private and rm purchases is particularly salient: rms are much less sensitive to fuel price changes than households. Altogether, our estimated elasticities suggest that such a policy would reduce the market share of diesel cars (from 69% to 66%) without notably changing average fuel eciency or CO 2 emission levels 3 . The short-term impact of the carbon tax would be even more modest on these outcomes. This paper is in line with a burgeoning literature on the impact of fuel prices on automobile sector. Most papers focus on American data (Allcott & Wozny, 2014 , Busse et al., 2013 3 In all our study, we assume that consumers react to changes in fuel prices indierently to whether they are due to a rise in fuel taxes or due to a rise in oil prices.
3 Klier & Linn, 2010) . Klier & Linn (2013) , who evaluate the eect of fuel prices on new vehicle fuel economy in the eight largest European markets (including France), observe strong dierences between European and American markets. Most of this existing literature is based on data with little or no information on consumers. Data, as used in this article, that are exhaustive and contain detailed information on both cars and purchasers, are rare. Indeed, our data allow us to observe purchaser heterogeneity: apart from the distinction between rms and private consumers, we split the sample according to several dimensions that may matter in the sensitivity to fuel prices. Previous results for France suggest that the elasticity of fuel demand to fuel prices in France is heterogeneous across demographic groups (Clerc & Marcus, 2009) , depending notably on working status. Using French data as well, Calvet & Marical (2011) argue that the impact of such taxes on the overall fuel consumption is low in the short term, because utilization is inelastic and the impact thus mostly passes through the renewal of the car-eet (which is the focus of this article).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our assumptions on the decision making process. Section 3 presents the data and some descriptive statistics. The model is presented in Section 4. Section 5 exposes results and robustness tests, and Section 7 concludes.
Choice model
To model market shares of new vehicles, we rely on a standard discrete choice model with dierentiated products. More specically, we assume that the purchaser buys one product that maximizes a linear utility, taking into account the characteristics of the available new vehicles. The individual valuation of these vehicles may vary among individuals (like e.g. Allcott & Wozny, 2014 , tracing back to seminal work by McFadden, 1978) .
We assume that consumers take a sequential decision, choosing rst a car segment (i.e. SUV, compact, etc; see list in Table 1 ), then a model (combination of nameplate and car body style) within that segment and nally one of the two fuel-type versions of that model 4 . This yields heterogeneous substitution patterns between products that are more or less similar. We rely on a nested logit specication with two nesting levels to account for this correlation structure. First, we assume that the individual unobserved preferences are correlated between a set of dened car segments. This specication makes e.g. a sporty BMW Z3 more substitutable to a BMW Z4 than to a bulky Citroen Berlingo. In addition, we assume that a model combines a set of unobserved characteristics valued by the 4 Nameplate refers to the brand name of the car, e.g. Corolla, Prius. Within the same nameplate, there are usually several models which are dened in this study by the intersection of a nameplate and a body style, i.e. Corolla sedan or Corolla station wagon. Each model usually exists in a diesel-and a gasoline-version.
consumer regardless of the engine type (gasoline or diesel). Thus, the preferences for the gasoline and diesel versions of the same nameplate series are expected to be correlated. We also consider an outside option, which is not to buy any new vehicle.
5 This substitution pattern is represented in the tree diagram of Fig. 1 .
The individual utility of choosing the product of model (combination of nameplate and car body style) j, fuel-type f and segment s, for purchaser i at month t is written:
where p jf t denotes the car price and X jf t represents the characteristics of new cars, namely horsepower, CO 2 class, number of doors, fuel-type, car body (sedan, sport, compact, etc.) and brand. p km jf t is the cost at time t for the amount of fuel needed to drive one km with the model j of fuel-type f . 6 ξ ijf t measures the unobserved (to the econometrician) preference for product jf . As such, it captures attributes like perceived quality, reliability and reputation.
To reect our decision process of Fig. 1 , we allow for a specic correlation structure between the unobserved idiosyncratic preferences for products of the same segment and for fuel-versions of the same model. We assume that the error term may be decomposed as:
where ν ijt measures the preference for unobserved characteristics of model j common to both fuel versions, for example design, while ν ist is common to all cars in the segment s, for example status symbol value. The remaining error e ijf t is assumed to be independent and identically distributed according to an extreme value distribution. It can be shown that we can nd a unique distribution for ν ist and ν ijt such that ijf t follows an extreme value distribution (Cardell, 1997) . This specication is standard in this literature (see in particular Berry, 1994) .
The parameters σ 1 and σ 2 capture the correlation between individual preferences for cars within nests, as dened above. As shown by McFadden (1978) , the nested logit model is consistent with random-utility maximization for values of σ 1 and σ 2 between 0 and 1. σ 1 = 0 means that substitution eects are identical across and within model, 7 while a high 5 As we consider monthly sales, the outside option's market share is likely to be much larger than any other option's share. For the sake of comparison, over the period the number of new cars registered a month ranges from 75,000 to 160,000 vehicles, for around 37.5 millions of drivers in France.
6 Another way to look at this would be to multiply the fuel consumption by the number of kilometers expected by the purchaser and using some sort of discounting; this is equivalent to our presentation if β i is simply dened to include this expected number of kilometers and discount factor of purchaser i. σ 1 (tending to 1) implies a high correlation between preferences for both fuel-versions of the same model. σ 2 = 0 implies that the purchaser is a priori indierent to substitute between models within and across segments (see for example Verboven (1996) for a more complete discussion of these terms).
The taste for characteristics and unobserved preferences for dierentiated products or the outside good might be dierent across heterogeneous individuals. For example, individual valuation by a purchaser of the price per kilometer depends on their expected traveled kilometers, which may vary depending on working status or area of living. Not accounting for such heterogeneity may result in biased estimates.
8 In the following we will thus dene groups of consumers based on observable characteristics and estimate preferences for each group separately. Purchasers face a discrete choice between dierent products, which are dened by a set of characteristics. The denition should be ne enough to avoid the aggregation of heterogeneous products. At the same time, a too narrow denition yields many zero (monthly) market shares. Trading o between these two eects, we dene a product by the intersection of brand, nameplate, fuel-type (diesel or gasoline), 9 and body style (e.g. city-car and sedan).
10 Given the outlined structure of the decision process, we exclude nameplates that are available with only one fuel-type (diesel or gasoline); this is only the case for rather exceptional cars which represent 22% of the nameplates but only 7% of sales.
Importantly, our administrative registration data match every sale of a new car with information on the new car owner. We can distinguish between private individuals and rms.
For the former, we observe the municipality they live in (postal code), their age and activity status (working or not). For the latter, we have information on the location and the business sector. It is a considerable advantage to take into account the heterogeneity in taste of customers for dierentiated products. Fuel price elasticities are likely to be related to consumer characteristics such as income, working status and area of residence. Most of the relevant literature on fuel elasticity does not rely on such an individual matching, but as noted by Bento et al. (2012) , this omission might entail erroneous ndings about fuel economy valuation.
9 We exclude electric and hybrid vehicles as they constitute a tiny share of the French market over the examined period. 
Diesel and gasoline cars
As shown by Hivert (2013) , the advantage given to diesel cars in France is particularly salient in international comparison. Figure 2 illustrates this specic position of France among European countries. Outside Europe, policies are even less favorable and dieselengines virtually do not exist: in both in Japan and the US, diesel cars make up about 2% of the overall car eet (Cames & Helmers, 2013 However, over the whole examined period, diesel fuel prices are signicantly lower than gasoline prices (Figure 3 ) because of the lower tax on diesel fuel. Indeed, fuel tax is a main component of French fuel prices. The nal fuel tax rates result from the combination of a lump sum tax 12 and the proportional VAT of 19.6%. From an accounting perspective, the fuel price can be decomposed as:
where t D and t G are the consumption lump-sum taxes for one liter of diesel and gasoline, respectively, and t V AT the VAT rate. Pre-tax prices for gasoline and diesel are highly correlated (correlation over 0.95) and their dierence is rather small (between -3 and 9 cents).
Although pre-tax diesel prices are, on average, slightly higher than pre-tax gasoline (3 cents higher), we assume that price variations of both depend equally on oil prices, denoted p e .
Over our study period the tax share exceeds 60% of the end-user price for gasoline and 50% for diesel. The tax rates on diesel are clearly advantageous relative to gasoline tax rates.
Additionally, diesel engines are more ecient than gasoline ones: they consume signicantly fewer liters of fuel to drive the same distance ( Figure 3 ). Across dierent cars in our data, the price of driving one kilometer, i.e. the product of fuel price p f and fuel consumption φ (which is measured in liters per 100 km 13 ), covers a wide range from e2.60 per 100 km up to e30.9 per 100 km depending on the car. However, the mean price of the km for new cars is more stable over our study period than the fuel prices ( Figure 3 ).
This may suggest a purchaser reaction counteracting price evolution: fuel price variations are not entirely reected in the average price-per-km, as they may be partly absorbed by variations in fuel consumption of purchased cars.
However, diesel cars produce more CO 2 than gasoline cars: one liter of gasoline is transformed to 2.33 kg of CO 2 while one liter of diesel is transformed to 2.63 kg of CO 2 .
14 Diesel cars also produce a long list of other toxic gases beyond CO 2 , as well as particulate matter (see e.g. Cames & Helmers, 2013) . As a consequence, there are calls to adjust diesel taxation. Two policies are under discussion: either to raise the level of diesel taxation per liter to the level of gasoline taxes or to introduce a carbon tax that is indexed on the CO 2 emissions of each fuel, i.e. increasing both fuels' taxes proportionally to the CO 2 12 Consumption tax on energy products, Taxe intérieure de consommation sur les produits énergétiques (TICPE).
13 Throughout this paper we use fuel consumption φ measured in liters per 100 km; this is the inverse of fuel eciency measured in miles per gallon (MPG), which is often used in the US.
14 The dierences in CO 2 emissions are due to the dierences in density of the fuel-types, see for example Demirel (2012) . The mass of CO 2 per liter of fuel that weights less than a kg might seem surprising; it results of the association of carbon elements from the fuel and ambient oxygen.
emissions per liter. In the following, we estimate the consequences of both of these policies.
Beyond fuel taxation, rms face an annual tax related both to the CO 2 class and to the fuel-type. Prior to 2004, the amount of this tax depended on horsepower; since 2004, it depends on CO 2 class, which is closely related to horse power but slightly less favorable to diesel cars.
15 As it may impact the preferences of rms towards one or other class, we use dummies for CO 2 classes in our estimations.
Fuel prices and cost per kilometer
We focus on the extent to which consumers take fuel prices into account when buying a new vehicle via the cost of driving. Our main variable of interest is thus the expected cost E(p km jf t ) at time t for the amount of fuel f needed to drive one km with the car jf . By denition, it depends on the car's fuel consumption φ jf , its fuel-type f (diesel or gasoline) and the fuel prices:
where φ jf denotes the characteristic fuel consumption (in L/100 km), p D and p G the fuel prices including tax for one liter of diesel and gasoline, respectively.
As a car is a durable good, the decision to buy a given product jf at time t should take into account the discounted utility of the future utilization of this car net of operating cost.
In particular, the purchaser should consider not only the current fuel prices at the time of purchase, but its expected changes in the future. We thus need an assumption on how purchasers forecast future gasoline prices: according to Anderson et al. (2013) , consumer beliefs regarding future fuel prices are indistinguishable from a no change forecast, consistent for example with fuel prices following a random walk. However, given that new cars are seldom sold o the rack, it usually takes a few months between purchase and the actual delivery and registration, which is our point of data collection. Thus, in our estimates, we do not use the contemporaneous fuel price but rather a three months lag of fuel prices.
A slightly more sophisticated approach would have been to use moving average, which may be consistent with a purchaser belief in mean-reversion of fuel prices. In a model similar to ours, Klier & Linn (2013) use both current fuel prices and moving averages, and observe that both alternative hypothesis on consumer beliefs yield very similar estimates.
Demographic groups
In order to account for heterogeneous preferences, we split our sample into three rm sectors and three types of private consumers. We further dierentiate types based on ge- These categories aim at capturing factors essential to vehicle choice. Vehicle purchasers are likely to take into account factors such as the frequency and duration of use, the space needed, as well as the luxury-price trade-o. Moreover, one would like to consider the extent to which a buyer can substitute to other means of transports (bike, public transport, etc.).
For both private consumers and rms, we dierentiate between types of residence areas.
Residence area (rural or urban) accounts for dierences in average travel distance and the availability of means of transport other than the car. In particular, the Paris region (Île-de-France) is considerably dierent from the rest of France, both in terms of economic development and its access to a dense public transportation network. Baccaini et al. (2007) show that the types of residence areas and in particular also Paris and its surroundings considerably dier regarding their average travel times and distances (see also As shown in Clerc & Marcus (2009) , French private consumer elasticity to fuel prices largely depends on whether the consumer uses their car to go to work, as commuting represents the majority of kilometers driven in France. Activity status is thus an additional important factor for private owners. We consider the three groups: young employed (under the age of 30), employed (over 30-year-old) and not employed, with the latter including retirees, the unemployed and students.
We moreover split the private household groups according to income. We proxy the buyers' income by the median earnings by age at the precise municipality (commune ) of each purchaser of new cars and dene two groups corresponding to the upper and lower half of this distribution. As group sizes are smaller in the Paris region, we do not distinguish along income dimensions for this region (see Table 10 in the Appendix for group sizes).
For rms, we dierentiate with respect to the business sector: industry and agriculture, car trade and repairing, trade and services.
Descriptive statistics conrm that fuel eciency of purchased cars is not homogeneous across purchaser types: private consumers living in a rural area, outside of the Paris region or who are young and employed tend to buy more fuel-ecient cars (Table 2 ). This is most likely linked to the fact that consumers expecting a high mileage pay more attention to fuel eciency. Revenue also plays a role with more auent consumers buying less ecient cars, which is more likely to be linked to preferences about comfort and quality than to mileage. There is variation across groups with a maximum dierence between e7.38 (urban Paris and not employed) and e6.16 (rural, young employed and low income). Among rm purchases, we see that rms outside the Paris region tend to buy more fuel-ecient cars, and especially the ones working in trade and services. As diesel cars are more fuel-ecient (see Table 11 in the Appendix for an overview) and have lower fuel prices, they are especially popular among consumers who drive large distances. Private customers living in suburban/rural areas or young employed are two groups who generally drive longer distances and, indeed, are more likely to own diesel cars (Table   3 ). Similarly, rms based outside the Paris region tend to own more diesel cars, especially those working in trade and services. Generally, the share of diesel cars is much larger among rm-owned vehicles than among private purchases. 
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Estimation
Nested logit equations and elasticities
We take advantage of the fact that our data provides detailed information on purchasers to account for consumer heterogeneity: we assume that systematic dierences in the valuation of dierent car characteristics are captured by the characteristics of purchasers that we observe in our data. We thus use the 30 types of purchasers as specied in Section 3.4 and estimate our model separately for each type. This is an alternative to random coecient models à la BLP (Berry et al., 1995) which are commonly used. These models recover unobserved heterogeneity of preferences, which is particularly useful when only aggregate market-level data is available. However, this comes at the cost of high computational complexity. This complexity has been shown to lead to numerical instability in some cases: Knittel & Metaxoglou (2014) show cases where results to largely depend on starting values and optimization algorithms. As relevant heterogeneity is assumed to be observed and captured by the demographic groups here, we can use the more constrained nested logit model with group-specic coecients (see also Grigolon & Verboven, 2014 for a discussion).
Under the nested logit assumption we can easily obtain the probability that a purchaser chooses one specic car. The aggregation of individual choices across purchasers of the same demographic group allows us to recover the market shares of each product jf (model j of fuel-type f ), up to an identifying normalization. As usual in the literature, identication stems from the normalization of the outside good's value to zero. As an intermediary step,
we thus obtain a linear specication for the market share s djf t of the product jf at time t among purchaser type d relatively to s d0t the market share of the outside good for that same demographic group:
where
is the relative share of purchases of fuel-type f within purchases of model j in each month t and s dj/s = s djt s dst is the relative share of model j within the sales of segment s.
However, these shares are dened over the whole potential market size, which in our case as in virtually all cases is unknown. Indeed, this market size corresponds to how many people consider buying a car in a given period and decide not to. As detailed information on this market size is unknown, using some approximation is a standard procedure in this literature (e.g. the seminal papers by McFadden, 1978 and Goldberg, 1995) , using for example most recent estimates of the population size or the number of people holding a driver's license. This number very likely overstates the actual market as with durable goods like cars, most consumers do not consider buying a car every month. Moreover, while a large portion of new car registrations are made by rms and not private owners, it is not clear whether these approximations are relevant. Besides, these estimates are typically not updated frequently. Huang & Rojas (2013) show both theoretically and practically that coecients estimated using such a wrong market size may be considerably biased.
To avoid this potential bias, we reformulate Equation (3): by using quantities rather than market shares, we can move all elements containing total market share to the right-hand side and estimate it as part of the year-specic constant. Panel dataset such ours are necessary to estimate our resulting main equation:
where q djf t stands for the number of sales of product jf . The quantity of the outside good q d0t is then estimated with a yearly time dummy variable. Moreover, we control for brand xed eects and the month. We also control for ocial CO 2 classes in order to account for potential ecological preferences linked to the CO 2 thresholds communicated to the pur- Our parameter of interest is the parameter β d measuring sensitivity to fuel prices. Beyond the estimation of parameters in Equation (4), our main focus lies upon the resulting fuel price elasticity, which takes into account both direct and indirect eects of an increase in fuel prices in the market share of one specic car. One may show that this elasticity may 16 be approximated by (see details of computation in the Appendix on page 36):
In order to give some intuition on this elasticity, we will discuss not only β, but also the
and
in the empirical section.
Endogenous variables and instruments
Gas prices can be considered as exogenous in the French case, as France represents about 2%
of world oil consumption and produces less than 0.1% of the world production.
17 French gas prices are dened by the international energy market, on which France has only a limited weight (while it may be not the case for the US, see Davis & Kilian (2011) for a discussion).
By contrast, the vehicle price p jf t is endogenous, as it is the result of demand and supply which by assumption vary with the unobserved attractiveness dening the error term ξ djf t .
Dierent sets of instruments can be found in the literature. We use a set of instruments based on the characteristics of potential substitutes aiming at capturing market density (and thus beyond production cost, the potential variation in mark-ups).
18 More specically, in a multi-product Bertrand competition framework, one can derive a set of instruments based on the sums of each characteristics of other models produced by the same rm in the same segment and those of competing rms. This measure is computed twice; once over all products within the same nest, and another time over all products in all other nests. Armstrong (2012) argued that in markets with a large number of heterogeneous goods, BLP instruments are not suciently strong anymore. We thus add cost-shifters, such as the prices of raw materials, may provide exogenous variations in market prices as they are related to supply but not demand. Thus, we use the price indices of iron (current and lagged value) and indices of export prices of tires as instruments, weighted by the car's weight. These cost shifters appear strongly correlated to vehicle prices.
Within segment, the market shares s dj/s is endogenous by denition. As for the price, we use BLP-style instruments for this variable and further add the number J s of oered goods per segment s. 18 In their seminal paper, Berry et al. (1995) show the rationale of such a set of instruments in a multiproduct Bertrand competition framework.
Finally, we instrument the within-model market share s df /j by the dierence in characteristics of gasoline and diesel versions (as well as the dierence in costs shifters for these two versions), capturing the relative attractiveness of each version.
We use the generalized method of moments to estimate Equation (4) separately for each demographic group, assuming these groups homogeneous enough to include only buyers with the same demand parameters.
5 Empirical results
Sensitivity of demand with respect to fuel prices
The coecients β d measure each demographic group's direct sensitivity to fuel prices. As expected, β d is statistically signicant for most demographic groups and is always negative when signicantly dierent from zero: as fuel prices increase, the demand for any given car decreases (Table 12 on page 41).
19 We nd substantial heterogeneity in the relative magnitude of β across purchaser types, especially with respect to employment and, to a smaller extent, to location, with non linear cross eects. This heterogeneity in preferences in this parameter may reect heterogeneous use of the cars, but also heterogeneous elasticity in the average driving. Some purchasers may reduce their average mileage more or less easily in case of higher fuel prices, for example because of alternative transport possibilities.
However, because of the nested logit specication, the magnitude of the parameters is not directly informative on the actual fuel prices elasticities. One has to consider indirect effects due to the correlation (and thus higher potential substitution) between gasoline and diesel versions of the same model captured by σ d1 , as well as substitution within segment measured by σ d2 . The estimates for these parameters are as expected all between 0 and 1. σ d1 is on average 0.5 implying a relatively high correlation between the two fuel-type versions of the same model (Table 13 on page 42 in the Appendix), while σ d2 is relatively low, on average 0.2, implying a relatively low correlation within segments (Table 14 and thus substitute more easily between them.
Ultimately, our aim is to use these parameters to determine the aggregate impact on market shares, diesel shares and fuel eciency. As discussed in Section 4, this requires evaluating the corresponding combination of parameters such as they enter Equation (5). The fuel consumption of a car φ sjf , the average fuel consumption over its modelφ j or other products in the same segmentφ s are all of the same order of magnitude. However, β 1−σ 1 (Table   4 ) dominates the two others (
(see Tables 15 and 16 in the Appendix).
Among private consumers, the eect of fuel price increases is stronger for employed consumers (Table 4) . Working people have to drive the more and traveling distances cannot be easily reduced; they are thus expected to be the more responsive to fuel price changes.
This may be somewhat reduced in the Paris region, where more public transport alternatives are available. Sensitivity to fuel prices is not signicantly dierent between high and low income populations in urban areas. In rural areas, on average private consumers living in high income municipalities react more to a change in fuel prices.
Generally, private consumers react more strongly to fuel prices than rms. Within rms, we see considerable heterogeneity (Table 4 ). The most responsive rms are in urban areas except Paris, and rms operating in car trade and repairing sectors in rural areas. In the Paris metropolitan region, sensitivity is particularly low and almost never signicant. One can argue that representative and status value is important to rms and rules out substitution to smaller, more ecient cars.
The signs of the other variables' coecients (not reported here, except the price coecient in Table 17 in the Appendix) are as expected: the vehicle price impacts utility negatively, while the 5-door-dummy and horsepower impact it positively. The coecient for diesel engines is small for most demographic groups; it can be negative or positive depending on the groups, expressing preference dierences between purchaser types.
Aggregate demand elasticities
The previously discussed estimates cannot be directly interpreted as price elasticities. However, we use them to compute the elasticity of specic cars with respect to fuel prices and taxes by adding up group-specic reactions (refer to the Appendix for details on the computation of these elasticities, page 36). We then further analyze the aggregate eect of two policies on the share of diesel cars purchased, fuel consumption and CO 2 emissions. First, we provide an estimate of the impact of the carbon tax proportional to actual emissions that has been voted in 2013 and due to take eect in 2016, then we provide an estimate of the impact of aligning the (currently more advantageous) diesel taxes on gasoline tax level. Source: CCFA, authors' calculations. Equation 4 is estimated by GMM separately for each type of purchasers. Other controlling variables include horsepower, brand xed eects, segment xed eects, class of CO 2 , month-year eects, and price. Instrumental variables for prices correspond to the price indices of iron (current and lagged value) and indices of export prices of tires, interacted with the car's weight; instrumental variables for intra-segment and intra-model market shares further include BLP-style instruments and dierences of characteristics between gasoline and diesel versions.
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Demand for selected products. For a given product, the elasticity of total demand to fuel prices (or fuel taxes) depends on both car's fuel eciency relative to competing products and on which part of the population predominantly consumes the given car (Table 5). For the sake of illustration, we compute dierent elasticities η sjf implied by the previously presented β for some selected cars, as well as the shifts in demand ∆ tc s j and ∆ t D s j corresponding to the carbon tax (t c ) and the equalization of diesel and gasoline taxes (t D ), respectively.
As expected, an increase in fuel prices (both gasoline and diesel) reduces demand for dierent cars (η sjf < 0), but the magnitude may vary signicantly. The carbon tax (implemented as an increase of 3.4c/L for gasoline and of 4c/L for diesel over a two years horizon) is estimated to decrease demand for gasoline and diesel cars (∆ tc s j < 0). The policy equalizing diesel and gasoline tax strongly lowers the demand for diesel cars (∆ t D s j < 0); for example the sales of the Audi A6 with diesel engine would decrease by 12.7% (Table 5 ).
The increase of diesel fuel tax on gasoline car demand is small but signicantly positive, reecting a substitution eect. Aggregate elasticities to fuel price variation. Beyond the reaction of demand for individual products, we are interested in the aggregate impact of a change in fuel prices.
From a policy perspective, the most interesting aspects are the impact on the share of diesel cars, on the mean fuel consumption and on the mean emission levels.
We assume that a change in underlying petrol prices through an international oil price shock impacts both gasoline and diesel prices. As diesel engines tend to be more ecient with an average fuel consumption of 5.7L/100km versus 6.9L/100km for gasoline engines (see Table 11 in the Appendix), a general fuel price increase would raise the share of diesel cars among new purchases π D (see Table 6 ).
20 Consequently, the average fuel consumption would decrease as well as CO 2 emission. However, all these eects have a small magnitude. 21 This corresponds to a price of e15 per ton of CO 2 and represents around 3 or 4% of the average end-user price. With such small variations, it seems not problematic to compute the impact using our estimated marginal elasticities.
The impact of this carbon tax policy on the share of diesel engines sold ∆ tc π D is positive, even though diesel tax is increased by a greater amount than gasoline tax. This (very small, but surprising) eect stems mostly from a composition eect: as Table 7 reveals, both private consumers and rms buy relatively fewer diesel engines. However, private consumers react much more on the extensive margin (substituting to the outside good and not buying a new car) so that the overall diesel share moves towards the (much higher) rm diesel share.
As such a tax increases end-user prices of both fuel-types, it pushes purchasers towards more fuel-ecient cars, but reduces both average fuel consumption as well as average CO 2 emission level by only -0.09% (Table 7) . At an average fuel consumption level of 6L/100km, this corresponds to a signicant but small decrease of less than 0.01L/100km. Tax alignment. We also estimate the impact of a policy that would equalize diesel and gasoline taxes. This represents a much bigger tax change, leaving gasoline taxes unchanged but raising diesel taxes by about a third from 44 cent/liter to 61 cent/liter. The impact of this policy is more complex.
As expected, the induced variation in diesel share is negative and strong: since taxes only increase for diesel, they would push many purchasers to substitute for a gasoline-fueled car.
We nd that such a policy would reduce the aggregate share of diesel cars in overall sales by 4.9%, that is from 69% to 66% (Table 7) . This decrease in diesel sales comes mostly from households that substitute much more easily away from diesel engines than rms (7.6% and 1.6% reduction, respectively). This result can be compared to the one in Klier & Linn (2013) who also evaluate a hypothetical policy of equalizing diesel and gasoline prices. At the European level, their estimates suggest that the impact of such a policy on the market share of diesel cars would be negligible (less than 1%). Two elements explain this dierence. First, our analysis is focused on France, where the gap between gasoline and diesel taxation is the highest of all countries they consider: the hypothetical policy change is strong (which is not the case for other countries), so it is not surprising to predict a stronger reaction.
22 Second, as they emphasize, Klier & Linn (2013) cannot distinguish in their data company cars from privately owned cars. According to our estimates, rms are much less sensitive to fuel prices (Table 6 ).
However, diesel cars are more fuel-ecient but produce more CO 2 per liter of fuel. The second considered policy thus increases fuel consumption (Table 7) and reduces the average CO 2 emission level of newly purchased cars. Nevertheless, both eects are rather small: the considerable jump in diesel tax we consider increases average fuel consumption by 0.35% and decreases average CO 2 emissions by 0.11%. Again, the overall magnitudes of these changes are signicant but small: fuel consumption would increase on average by 0.01L/100km and CO 2 emissions would be reduced on average by 0.16g/km (at a mean of 152g/km).
The impact of both policies on fuel eciency and CO 2 emissions is thus economically small.
The second policy induces a noticeable shift away from diesel engines that are shown to produce many other greenhouse gases as well as harmful particulate matter.
Robustness checks
Taking into account the correlation between fuel and gasoline versions comes at a price, as we restrict the sample size to models sold in both versions at one date. In order to test the sensitivity of our results to this restriction we use a more commonly used model using only two levels: purchasers choose a segment and then a product within that segment. The two fuel-type versions of a model then count as independent products, which is the same as constraining all σ d1 coecients to zero. Table 8 shows that the results are similar with only a small increase in magnitude. Using the estimates to compute the reaction to our two policies of interest, this dierence increases and we see that especially the impact on the diesel share is overestimated but the intuition remains unchanged (Table   9 ). Although the changes are small, we still reject this more constrained model as in our 22 Estimates detailed by countries are available on a previous working paper (Klier & Linn, 2011) . They obtain that the diesel market share in France would decrease by 1.4 percentage points. This reduction is higher than the eect in most other countries they examine. 24 main estimation σ d1 was signicantly dierent from zero for almost all demographic groups.
Although our partition in demographic groups is based on demographic characteristics essential to the choice of a new car, one could ask about the impact of abolishing such a partition and assuming preferences homogeneous across the population. It appears that this specication gives a similar order of magnitude for the fuel price sensitivity parameter β. Bento et al. (2012) suggested that unaccounted heterogeneity biases estimated elasticity downwards, which we do not nd here (Table 8) . However, the carbon tax appears to decrease the diesel share (Table 9 ), while our main specication suggests an increase: as private consumers and rms are mixed here, we do not observe the impact of their dierent substitution patterns.
Our main specication still seems most appropriate, but these alternative specications do not dramatically change the implications of our paper.
Limitations
This study aims at estimations demand side eects of fuel taxes. Although we carefully consider many caveats arising from our static choice model, it still has some limitations that should be discussed.
Other than most literature on this question, we do not assess the rationality (or myopia) of consumer's reaction to fuel price changes. Indeed, we do not use any data on mileage nor assume anything on car lifetime and discounting, so that we remain agnostic on the actual potential prot a consumer realizes with fuel eciency. We see it as an advantage not to rely on very specic assumptions about utilization reaction of consumers. Nevertheless, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that reactions are too small to account fully for the change in operating cost if utilization remains constant. In this light, it appears especially surprising that rm purchases are even less reactive to fuel price changes than households' purchases. We are the rst paper documenting this dierence. Further research is needed to clarify whether this is due to households incurring a incomparably bigger mileage or whether there are behavioral and organizational factors at play.
Ultimately, the aim of environmental policy is not to increase fuel-eciency, but to decrease CO 2 emissions which result from the interaction of fuel-eciency and mileage. Additional research is needed to clarify the impact of cars' fuel-eciency on car mileage. Previous research suggests that rebound eects might reduce any impact on fuel-eciency (see for example Austin & Dinan, 2005) , so that our (already small) estimated eects become even less economically and environmentally signicant. Nevertheless, the change in the composition of the vehicle eet impacts fuel consumption in the long run as cars are kept on 
Main specication -Nests (segment>model>fuel-type) Households −0.03 average for 13 years in France (Bilot et al., 2013) .
Moreover, our eects are identied on relatively small variations. While under strict rationality assumptions, purchaser reaction should be scalable from smaller to bigger variation, we ignore all behavioral eects. The carbon tax considered in this study has a magnitude similar to observed fuel price variations. Still, a policy might have a signal eect beyond the simple cost-increase and might induce a more sizable shift in preferences. This eect can be reinforced by supply side reaction. Moreover, the considered policy equalizing diesel and gasoline tax is somewhat bigger in magnitude than fuel price variations used in this study, so that we cannot guarantee for nonlinearities in consumer reaction to bigger price changes.
Finally, an important limitation of this paper is that our simple demand model does not take into account long-run shifts on the supply-side. While one can be condent that the monthly fuel price variation used for identication in this article does not impact supply instantaneously, it is likely that producers react to long-term shifts: if fuel eciency becomes more valuable, they might in the medium-run adjust their prices and in the long-run adjust the products developed and oered. For Klier & Linn (2013) this means that these 27 short-run results underestimate the true impact on fuel eciency and emissions, which would be enhanced by the producers' reaction. However, as shown by Verboven (2002) , producers' price reaction should counteract purchaser reaction to changes in dierential fuel taxation. Klier & Linn (2013) suggest that this is already observable on the French market: Using data for several European countries from 1991 to 1994, he observes that producers use the favorable diesel policy to put higher mark-ups on diesel cars. Bilot et al. (2013) obtain similar results on more recent period comparing gasoline and diesel versions of the same car in France and UK. Both of these producer-side reactions are ignored in our model, as this paper measures mainly the short to medium-term purchaser reaction. Finally however, producers are unlikely to change their oer drastically if consumer reaction is as small as our estimates suggest.
Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of fuel prices on new automobile purchases of both households and rms. These estimates allow us to compute elasticities which we aggregate to estimate ex ante the impact of two tax reforms: rst a carbon tax, i.e. a tax increase proportional to CO 2 emissions of each fuel-type, and second a tax reform increasing the diesel tax to the same level as gasoline tax. Using a nested logit specication, we control for hedonic valuation of a large range of car characteristics. Our individual registration data provides a potentially important advantage, as we can account for a considerable share of purchaser heterogeneity and our estimates are thus less prone to omitted sorting bias. We indeed nd that purchaser types react dierently to fuel tax changes. Most of aggregate market reaction comes from a consumption shift from urban and non working consumers; private consumers react more strongly than rms. To our knowledge, this important distinction between household and rm purchases has not been taken into the account in any previous literature.
The examined carbon tax, recently voted to be implemented in 2016, is expected to slightly increase the share of (relatively fuel-ecient) diesel cars among new purchases. It is expected to decrease both fuel consumption and CO 2 emission level signicantly, but the overall amounts stay low.
We also examine a possible policy equalizing tax levels on gasoline and diesel. This policy would decrease the share of diesel cars in sales more substantially from 69% to 66%. As purchasers would substitute to (less ecient) gasoline cars, the average fuel consumption would rise in response to this policy, while at the same time average CO 2 emission would slightly decrease as gasoline cars emit less CO 2 per liter of used fuel. This eect is heterogeneous between dierent types of purchasers, especially between private consumers and rms.
All in all, these estimated eects of these two tax policies can be considered as small. They are short-term eects. In the long run, these eects might be larger if households react more to persistent shifts in prices and producers adjust the oered choice set. On the contrary, these estimates do not take into account an induced eect on mileage so that it is not possible to predict the overall change in CO 2 emissions.
A Appendix
Descriptive statistics The demand elasticity η sjf for a given product with respect to oil price p e exclusive of tax at a given point in time can be computed using parameters corresponding to the demand model. Fuel prices aect all products proportionally to their fuel consumption: both the nominator and the denominator of the market shares are impacted. In order to nd this elasticity, let us dierentiate equation (3) for the model j in segment s and of fuel-type f , using the denition of the cost per kilometer:
or slightly rearranged:
We then aggregate this last equation over both fuel-type versions of the same model, in
order to obtain the change in the market share of one model j in one segment s:
Thus we obtain that 
Combining these expressions in 6 we nally can compute the elasticity η sjf as:
The demand elasticity depends on the parameter β measuring sensitivity to fuel prices, the VAT rate t V AT , 24 as well as on the current price of fuel and the car's fuel consumption φ sjf relative to the average fuel economy of its substitutes (within the same modelφ j , within its segmentφ s and among all salesφ). The share of the outside good s 0 is very close to 1, as a monthly frequency is high compared to vehicle lifetime: most people do not buy a car in any given month and monthly sales are small compared to the market size. Thus, the second term involvingφ(1 − s 0 ) is negligible.
The easier purchasers substitute between fuel-type versions of the same model (resp. between models within a segment), the higher is σ 1 (resp. σ 2 ) and thus the higher is ρ 1 (resp. ρ 2 ); intuitively speaking, a higher correlation of preference for similar products (same nests) leads to a relatively higher weight put onto the comparison with these similar products.
Obviously, diesel taxes aect cars dierently depending on their fuel-type. Using our main model dened in Equation (4), the elasticity η t D sjf of demand for a given car sjf with respect to an increase in diesel tax (holding gasoline tax constant) can be computed as:
where the indicator 1 f =diesel takes the value 1 if the vehicle sjf is running on a diesel engine, π 
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close to zero and this elasticity can be closely approximated by the rst part of the equation.
Intuitively, an increase in the diesel tax rate has a direct negative impact for all diesel cars.
However, this eect may be reduced if its substitutes are also impacted by this increase.
The eect for gasoline cars of a diesel tax is expected to be positive.
On a more aggregate level we examine the impact of an increase in fuel prices on the composition of the automobile eet, with a particular focus on the amount of diesel cars purchased. More specically, we evaluate the elasticity of the share of diesel cars among new purchases π D . Assuming again that an international oil price shift equally aects both gasoline and diesel pre-tax prices, such a price shift would change the share of diesel cars by η D . In the simple logit demand, this can be computed as: The interpretation of this equation is not straightforward. In the simplest logit case
. Quite naturally, η D depends on the average fuel consumption of diesel cars relative to the overall average fuel consumption.φ D −φ is always negative because diesel cars are more fuel-ecient. β is negative as well, so that η D is positive: if fuel prices increase, purchasers substitute to more fuel-ecient diesel cars and their share among purchases increases.
In a nested setup the eect is less straightforward, but we still expect a positive sign.
Indeed, the rst term S 1 in Equation 10 involves the dierence between diesel fuel con- 
This elasticity η t D D depends only on the fuel consumption of diesel cars and on their relative share among purchases: the lower their fuel consumption, the smaller the impact of a diesel tax increase.
Finally, we can also compute the elasticity η φ (respectively η CO 2 ) of the average fuel consumption (respectively of average CO 2 emission levels) of new cars with respect to fuel prices p e and to fuel taxes.
For example, in the simple logit demand model, η φ simplies to:
with φ 2 is the mean of squared fuel consumption of new vehicles. The impact of an oil price shock on average fuel consumption depends thus on the ratio of the variance and the mean of fuel consumption. Both the variance and the mean of φ are always positive, so that η φ is always negative in the simple logit case: when fuel prices increase, we expect to nd that average fuel consumption is reduced. In the more realistic nested logit demand model, the conclusion is less straightforward. Again, we have some intuition for the rst 
2 and is thus expected to be negative.
The elasticity of average fuel consumption η
) to a change in diesel tax (holding gasoline tax constant) may be written in case of a simple logit demand model:
This elasticity depends on the fuel consumption of diesel cars and on their relative share among purchases compared with the average fuel consumption. The sign is not clear-cut.
An increase in the diesel tax may reduce the share of diesel cars, which are more fuelecient. The higher the gap between the average fuel consumption of gasoline and diesel cars, the higher the increase in the average fuel emissions of new cars. This eect may be partially oset by the dispersion in fuel emissions of diesel cars, as we expect that an increase in diesel prices has more impact on the less fuel-ecient cars. All in all, we expect that a rise in diesel tax increases the average fuel emissions of new cars if diesel cars are much more fuel-ecient that gasoline cars and that the diesel share is not too high.
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Complementary results
Estimates for remaining parameters in main specication . Source: CCFA, authors' calculations. Equation 4 is estimated by GMM separately for each type of purchasers. Other controlling variables include horsepower, brand xed eects, segment xed eects, class of CO 2 , month-year eects, and price. Instrumental variables for prices correspond to the price indices of iron (current and lagged value) and indices of export prices of tires, interacted with the car's weight; instrumental variables for intra-segment and intra-model market shares further include BLP-style instruments and dierences of characteristics between gasoline and diesel versions. is estimated by GMM separately for each type of purchasers. Other controlling variables include horsepower, brand xed eects, segment xed eects, class of CO 2 , month-year eects, and price. Instrumental variables for prices correspond to the price indices of iron (current and lagged value) and indices of export prices of tires, interacted with the car's weight; instrumental variables for intra-segment and intra-model market shares further include BLP-style instruments and dierences of characteristics between gasoline and diesel versions. is estimated by GMM separately for each type of purchasers. Other controlling variables include horsepower, brand xed eects, segment xed eects, class of CO 2 , month-year eects, and price. Instrumental variables for prices correspond to the price indices of iron (current and lagged value) and indices of export prices of tires, interacted with the car's weight; instrumental variables for intra-segment and intra-model market shares further include BLP-style instruments and dierences of characteristics between gasoline and diesel versions. Source: CCFA, authors' calculations. Equation 4 is estimated by GMM separately for each type of purchasers. Other controlling variables include horsepower, brand xed eects, segment xed eects, class of CO 2 , month-year eects, and price (/10,000 euros). Instrumental variables for prices correspond to the price indices of iron (current and lagged value) and indices of export prices of tires, interacted with the car's weight; instrumental variables for intra-segment and intra-model market shares further include BLP-style instruments and dierences of characteristics between gasoline and diesel versions. Source: CCFA, authors' calculations. Equation 4 is estimated by GMM separately for each type of purchasers. Other controlling variables include horsepower, brand xed eects, segment xed eects, class of CO 2 , month-year eects, and price (/10,000 euros). Instrumental variables for prices correspond to the price indices of iron (current and lagged value) and indices of export prices of tires, interacted with the car's weight; instrumental variables for intra-segment and intra-model market shares further include BLP-style instruments and dierences of characteristics between gasoline and diesel versions. is estimated by GMM separately for each type of purchasers. Other controlling variables include horsepower, brand xed eects, segment xed eects, class of CO 2 , month-year eects, and price (/10,000 euros). Instrumental variables for prices correspond to the price indices of iron (current and lagged value) and indices of export prices of tires, interacted with the car's weight; instrumental variables for intra-segment and intra-model market shares further include BLP-style instruments and dierences of characteristics between gasoline and diesel versions.
